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Finucane: Finucane: Our Federalism-The Limitation of Younger

COMMENTS
"OUR FEDERALISM"-THE LIMITATION OF
YOUNGER-SAMUELS AND THEIR PROGENY
ON FEDERAL INTERVENTION IN
STATE COURT PROCEEDINGS
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1971, the United States Supreme Court handed down a series of
decisions' (hereinafter referred to as the Younger-Samuels decisions) addressing the propriety of federal injunctive and declaratory relief against
pending state criminal proceedings. In the course of his opinion in Younger
v. Harris,2 Justice Hugo Black discussed the general policy of restraint with
regard to federal interference in state court proceedings and called it "Our
Federalism."3 This "longstanding public policy," 4 derived from principles
of equity, comity, and federalism, has potential impact beyond the limits of
the Younger-Samuels decisions. The principle is applicable to all federal
court interference in state civil proceedings and criminal justice systems.
The subject of this comment is the effect that the doctrine of "Our
Federalism" and the decisions in Younger-Samuels and their progeny have
had on the relationship between the state and federal courts; more specifically, how the doctrine has affected the availability of federal injunctive and
declaratory relief against state court proceedings.' The application of "Our
Federalism" to pending criminal proceedings, threatened criminal proceedings, pending and threatened civil proceedings, and its potential application to administrative proceedings will be examined. It will be apparent
that the Federal Anti-Injunction Statute has been substantially curtailed as
a limitation in this area. In order to fully understand the applicable princi1. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66
(1971); Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971);
Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200 (1971); Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216 (1971).
2. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
3. Id. at 44.
4. Id. at 43.
5. Federal courts have expanded the scope of Younger-Samuels beyond intervention in state court proceedings. See Wallace v. Kern, 520 F.2d 400 (2d Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 912 (1976); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976)
(dictum). See generally Zeigler, An Accomodation of the Younger Doctrine and the Duty of
the FederalCourts to Enforce ConstitutionalSafeguards in the State CriminalProcess, 125
U. PA. L. REv. 266 (1976).
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ples, it is necessary first to trace the history of federal injunctive and

declaratory relief against state court proceedings. The impact of the Younger-Samuels decisions and their progeny on the propriety of federal interference may then be analyzed.
The doctrine of "Our Federalism" and the Younger-Samuels decisions
are primarily a symbol of judicial restraint toward federal interference
in the functions and responsibilities of the states. It will be shown that

rather than establish new standards governing the availability of injunctive
and declaratory relief, the Supreme Court has stringently applied traditional equitable principles that it has flexibly applied for the last one
hundred years. The Court has retained the discretionary power to adjust
the availability of federal relief in accordance with its perception of the
need for federal intervention. Today, the federal injunction and declaratory judgment directed against a state proceeding remains a discretionary
remedy, albeit with a considerably limited availability due to YoungerSamuels and their progeny.
II.

HISTORY OF FEDERAL INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AGAINST
STATE COURT PROCEEDINGS

Federal equity jurisdiction was conferred by Congress upon lower
federal courts in 1789.6 The forms of process were to be in accord with the
"principles, rules and usages which belong to courts of equity . . .as
contradistinguished from courts of common law," 7 subject to a rulemaking
power in the Supreme Court. Equitable jurisdiction of the federal courts
was considered to be the same as that of the High Court of Chancery of
England in 1789,8 including all the traditional obstacles to injunctive
relief.9
The Supreme Court recognized the power of a lower federal court to
enjoin state officials from enforcing an unconstitutional state law in 1824.0
Few such injunctions were issued prior to the 1875 expansion to general
federal question jurisdiction in federal courts." In 1888 the Supreme
6. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 78.
7. Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 93-94. This formula lasted until law
and equity were merged in 1938 by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See H.
HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, 664-65
(2d ed. 1973).
8. Thompson v. Railroad Cos., 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 134, 137 (1867); Robinson v.
Campbell, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 212, 223 (1818).
9. The three most significant obstacles were: 1) equity will not enjoin a
criminal prosecution 2) plaintiff must show the threat of irreparable injury 3)
remedy at law must be inadequate. See Whitten, FederalDeclaratory and Injunctive
Interference with State Court Proceedings: The Supreme Court and the Limits of Judicial
Discretion, 53 N. CAR. L. REV. 591, 597-616 (1975).
10. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 841-60
(1824). See Lockwood, Maw & Rosenbery, The Use of FederalInjunction in Constitutional Litigation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 426, 431 (1930).
11. Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1,18 Stat. 470. See Warren, Federaland
State Court Interference, 43 HARV. L. REV. 345 (1930).
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Court considered the availability of federal court interference with a state
criminal proceeding in In re Sawyer.12 It held that the federal courts were
3
without jurisdiction to enjoin a pending state criminal proceeding.' Immediately thereafter, the United States moved into a period of great
economic expansion. State legislatures responded by enacting criminal laws
regulating interstate commerce. Industry turned to the federal courts
seeking to enjoin the enforcement of these laws and convinced the Supreme Court to4 assume an activist posture based on a substantive due
process theory.'
In a series of cases the railroads challenged the constitutionality of
state criminal maximum rate statutes. The Court found the statutes to be
violative of due process and enjoined threatened enforcement by state
officials.'" The culmination of this series was Ex parte Young. 6 It established two essential foundations for federal injunctive relief against state
criminal proceedings. The Court held that a suit in federal court to enjoin
state officials did not violate the eleventh amendment's prohibition of suits
against states because acts by state officials under an unconstitutional
statute stripped them of official authority. 17 The Court also held that
federal courts had equity jurisdiction to enjoin threatened state criminal
proceedings under an unconstitutional statute. The Court discussed the
inadequacy of the legal remedy (raising a defense to the criminal charges in
the state proceeding)'9 indicating two underlying principles favoring federal intervention which remain persuasive today: that a party should not be
forced to violate a criminal statute to obtain a determination of his legal
rights, and that the federal courts should be available to make that determi20
nation.
After Young, the Court continued to rule on the constitutionality of
criminal statutes based on substantive economic due process. 21 There was
12. 124 U.S. 200 (1888).
13. Id. at 221.
14. See Cook, History of Rate Determination Under the ProcessClauses, 11 U. Cm.
L. REV. 297 (1944).
15. Prout v. Starr, 188 U.S. 537 (1903); Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, modified, 171 U.S. 361 (1898); Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362
(1894); Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418 (1890).
16. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
17. Id. at 156.
18. Id. at 161-62.
19. Id. at 165.
20. The decision in Ex parte Young, along with the Civil Rights Act of 1871 and
federal jurisdiction expansion in 1875, "established the modern framework for
federal protection of constitutional rights from state interference." Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 107 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). The immediate congressional response to Ex parte Young was not favorable.
Congress created three-judge district courts to hear suits for injunctions against
state statutes. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1253, 2281, 2284 (1970); Hutcheson, A Casefor Three
Judges, 47 HARV. L. REV. 795 (1934); Note, The Three-Judge DistrictCourt: Scope and
Procedure Under Section 2281, 77 HARV. L. REV. 299 (1963).
21. Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman, 266 U.S. 497 (1925); Terrace v.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1977
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never a rejection of traditional equitable obstacles to injunctive relief, but
the equitable obstacles were either loosely applied or ignored when the
Court wished to exercise jurisdiction.
One traditional obstacle is the principle that equity will not enjoin a
criminal prosecution. This originated with the English High Court of
Chancery's renunciation of its criminal jurisdiction 22 and subsequently was
accepted by American courts of equity. 23 The principle often was cited in
cases during this period, but exceptions were found for prior subject
matter jurisdiction in equity court 24 and protection of plaintiffs' property
interests.2 5 These cases emasculated the principle's prohibition. The principle is frequently cited in modern opinions, but exceptions are found
when courts wish to grant equitable relief.
Other traditional obstacles to injunctive relief are the requirements of
irreparable injury and inadequate legal remedy. The decisions of this
period discussed these standards, usually combining them in a single requirement of irreparable injury. They were the basis of both denial 26 and
exercise of equitable jurisdiction. 27 Both irreparable injury and inadequate
legal remedy are highly discretionary standards shaped by the courts'
desire to grant equitable relief. The Supreme Court's flexibility in the
application of traditional equitable obstacles reflected a desire to protect
federal constitutional rights during the period of due process activism and
the Court's dissatisfaction with the remedy of raising a defense in the state
criminal proceeding. More importantly, however, the Court retained the
discretionary power to control the availability of federal intervention in
state criminal proceedings. If the Court stringently applied traditional
equitable principles, it still could effectively limit the availability of federal
relief.
Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923);Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917);
Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S.
61 (1911).
22. Whitten, supra note 9, at 598.
23. In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200 (1888). See Note, Injunctions Against Criminal
Proceedings, 14 HARV. L. REV. 293 (1900); Developments in the Law-Injunctions, 78
HARV. L. REV. 994, 1024 (1965).
24. Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); Prout v. Starr, 188 U.S. 537 (1903).
25. Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman, 266 U.S. 497 (1925); Packard v.
Banton, 264 U.S. 140 (1924); Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923);
Cavanaugh v. Looney, 248 U.S. 453 (1919).
26. Cavanaugh v. Looney, 248 U.S. 453 (1919); Davis & Farnum Mfg. Co. v.
Los Angeles, 189 U.S. 207 (1903). Compare Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U.S. 223
(1904). See also Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U.S. 516 (1899).
27. Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33
(1915); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). In a number of cases the Court
assumed jurisdiction without discussion of irreparable injury. Hygrade Provision
Co. v. Sherman, 266 U.S. 497 (1925); Packard v. Bunton, 264 U.S. 140 (1924); Hall
v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220
U.S. 61 (1911). See Note, Federal Relief Against Threatened State Prosecutions: The
Implications of Younger, Lake CarriersandRoe, 48 N.Y.U.L. REV. 965, 975-79 (1973);
Note, IrreparableInjuiy in Constitutional Cases, 46 YALE L.J. 255, 269-72 (1936).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol42/iss4/3
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The first indication of a shift in judicial attitude towards limiting the
availability of federal intervention came in Fenner v. Boykin. 28 Affirming
a three judge district court denial of injunctive relief against a state prosecution, the Court stated that federal intervention was barred except when
"absolutely necessary for protection of constitutional rights" and "extraordinary circumstances where the danger of irreparable loss is both great and
imminent. ' 29 This language was much more restrictive than that used just
three years earlier in Terrace v. Thompson 30 where the Court required a
"plain, adequate and complete remedy at law . . . as complete, practical
and efficient as equity"'" to bar federal intervention. After the language in
Fenner, the Court continued to rule on the constitutionality of state statutes
either without discussing jurisdiction3 2 or by applying pre-Fenner stan33
dards.
The 1930's brought the Depression and with it the demise of judicial
activism based on substantive due process.3 4 In suits to enjoin threatened
enforcement of allegedly unconstitutional state statutes, the issue became
whether the plaintiff established a cause of action within federal equity
jurisdiction. 35 A policy of non-interference with threatened state criminal
proceedings was established by application of a Fenner-type standard for
federal intervention. In Beal v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Corp.36 the Court
stated that interference with the process of criminal law in state court and
the determination of questions of criminal law by courts of federal equity
can be justified "only in most exceptional circumstances, and upon clear
showing that an injunction is necessary in order to prevent irreparable
injury., 37 Thus, the Court continued to use traditional equitable principles,
but applied the requirement of irreparable injury so stringently as to
preclude federal equity jurisdiction over substantive due process challenges to state criminal statutes regulating business.
During this period, the Court also considered the availability of federal
injunctions against the enforcement of state statutes alleged to be unconstitutional restrictions on first amendment rights. It granted injunctive
28. 271 U.S. 240 (1926).
29. Id. at 243. See also Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445 (1927).
30. 263 U.S. 197 (1923).
31. Id. at 214.
32. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935); Magnano Co. v.
Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40 (1934); State Bd.of Tax Comm'rs v. Jackson, 283 U.S. 527
(1931); Carley & Hamilton, Inc. v. Snook, 281 U.S. 66 (1930); Cudahy Packing Co.
v. Hinkle, 278 U.S. 460 (1929); Gulf Fisheries Co. v. Macinerney, 276 U.S. 124
(1928); Interstate Buses Corp. v. Holyoke St. Ry. Co., 273 U.S. 45 (1927).
33. Williams v. Standard Oil, 278 U.S. 235 (1929); Tyson & Brother v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418 (1927).
34. See Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REv. 1 (1950).
35. Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943). Bealv. Missouri P.R.R.,
312 U.S. 45 (1941); Spielman Motor Sales Co. v. Dodge, 295 U.S. 89 (1935). See also
Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387 (1941).
36. 312 U.S. 45 (1941).
37. Id. at 50.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1977
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relief in a number of challenges,"8 but later seemed to apply Fenner-type
standards in Douglas v. City of Jeanette.3 9 The Court stated that federal
courts should refuse
to interfere with or embarass threatened proceedings in state
courts save for those exceptional cases which call for the interposition of a court of equity to prevent irreparable injury which is
clear and imminent.
The clear impression was that the protection of first amendment
rights did
41
not merit greater availability of federal injunctive relief.
The next forum for the use of the federal injunction against
threatened state criminal proceedings came in the desegregation of educational facilities and public accommodations in the South. 42 Although the
Court often affirmed the granting of injunctive relief,43 it seldom discussed
the propriety of federal intervention in state proceedings."4 This illustrates
that the Court retained the discretion to apply or to ignore traditional
equitable principles according to the strength of its desire to exercise
equitable jurisdiction.
It was not until 1966 in Dombrowski v. Pfister45 that the Court again
addressed the issue of the availability of federal injunctive relief against
state criminal proceedings. The case involved a challenge to a Louisiana
"subversive activities" statute on the ground that it was an unconstitutionally overbroad and vague restriction on freedom of speech. The Court held,
for the first time, that a federal injunction was available against a pending
state criminal prosecution 46 and broadened the availability of injunctions
38. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). Hague
v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233
(1936). See also Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
39. 319 U.S. 157 (1943).
40. Id. at 163.
41. It should be noted that the Court reversed the convictions of the plaintiffs
in Douglas in another decision issued the same day. Murdock v. Penn., 319 U.S. 105
(1943).
42. One of the consolidated suits in the famous Brown v. Board of Education
case was to enjoin enforcement of South Carolina constitutional and statutory
provisions. 347 U.S. at 486. See generally Maraist, Federal Injunctive Relief Against
State Court Proceedings: The Significance of Dombrowski, 48 TEx. L. REV. 535, 548-52
(1970).
43. Faubus v. United States, 254 F.2d 797 (8th Cir. 1958), aff'd mem., 361 U.S.
197 (1959); Morrison v. Davis, 252 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 356 U.S.
968 (1958); Bush v. Orleans Parish School Dist., 194 F. Supp. 182 (E.D. La. 1961)
(three-judge court), aff'd mem. sub. nom., Gremillion v. United States, 368 U.S. 11
(1961); Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala. 1956) (three-judge court),
affd mem., 352 U.S. 903 (1956).
44. In a case involving an alleged illegal search and seizure, the Court did
discuss the issue and essentially reaffirmed the Douglas standards. Steffanelli v.
Minard, 343 U.S. 117 (1951).
45. 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
46. The Court maintained that there was no "pending" prosecution because
the indictments were not obtained until after the filing of the federal petition. Id. at
484 n.2.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol42/iss4/3
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against threatened criminal prosecutions. It rejected the assumption that a
defense in state court would provide ample protection of first amendment
rights because of the "chilling effect" of an overbroad restriction on freedom of speech.4 7 The Court apparently determined that sufficient irreparable injury existed to enjoin a pending or threatened criminal prosecution
when that prosecution either was based on an overbroad statute or was
carried out in bad faith.
The decision in Dombrowski was significant in three respects. It directed that an injunction be issued to restrain a pending state criminal proceeding. It afforded the first amendment freedom of expression special
protection in federal courts. It also suggested that state courts would "not
be as prone as federal
courts to vindicate constitutional rights promptly
48
and effectively."
Dombrowski reflected the activist posture of the Court and a willingness
to interfere with state criminal law enforcement. The later Younger-Samuels
decisions and their progeny were the response of a Court with a considerably more restrained philosophy on the prudence of federal interference. Before discussing those decisions, an exploration of the history of
federal declaratory relief against state court proceedings is appropriate.
III.

HISTORY OF FEDERAL DECLARATORY RELIEF AGAINST
STATE COURT PROCEEDINGS

The declaratory judgment is a judicial determination, without coercive
effect, of the rights and liabilities of the parties to a controversy. 49 Congress
granted federal courts the authority to render declaratory judgments in
1934.50 It was intended to be a mechanism to settle disputes before disruption of the status quo and was based on the assumption that in a civilized
society coercion was unnecessary to secure obedience to court decrees. 51 It
was also intended to be a discretionary remedy52 available to challenge
criminal statutes.53 Early cases clearly held that its availability as a remedy
was not to be governed by traditional equitable principles.5 4 Instead, its
47. Id. at 486-89.
48. Id. at 499 (Harlan J., dissenting).
49. See Developments in the Law-DeclaratoryJudgments 1941-1949, 62

HARV.

L.

REV. 787 (1949).

50. Act of June 14, 1934, ch. 512, 48 Stat. 955; 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (1970).
See generally Borchard, The Federal DeclaratoryJudgment Act, 21 VA. L. REV. 35
(1934).
51. See S. REP. No. 1005, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2-6 (1934); H.R. REP. No. 1264,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1934); Hearings on H.R. 5623 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 70th Cong. lst Sess. 21, 38-40 (1928); Whitten, supra note 9,
at 642.
52. See S. REP. No. 1005, supra note 51 at 2; Borchard, supra note 50, at 49.
53. See S. REP. No. 1005, supra note 51 at 3, 6; Hearingson H.R. 5623, supra
note 51 at 18-19.
54. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 241 (1937); Nashville, C. &
St. L. Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249, 264 (1933). Compare Great Lakes Dredge &
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1977
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availability
is governed by the amorphous standard of sound judicial dis55
cretion.
The exercise of judicial discretion has resulted in dismissal of suits
seeking declaratory judgments on the constitutionality of non-criminal
statutes for a variety of reasons. The Court has denied relief citing restraint
in interference with state policies and responsibilities 56 and deference to a
pending state proceeding.5 7 Where no state proceedings were pending, the
Court has sometimes required a specific threat of enforcement to constitute a ripe controversy.5 1 It has often repeated the standard in Maryland
Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co. 9 for determining the existence of a
ripe controversy:
whether the facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show there
is a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal
interest, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of declaratory judgment. 0
The broad discretion afforded federal courts in granting declaratory relief
has precluded the development of specific standards governing its availability.
The use of the declaratory judgment independent of an injunction to
challenge state criminal statutes was a form of relief apparently seldom
sought by federal plaintiffs or discussed by the Supreme Court until recently. 6 1 In 1968 the Court addressed the issue in two decisions dealing
with a challenge to a New York election pamphlet control statute. In
Zwickler v. Koota 61 the Court established two principles. One was that
federal courts have jurisdiction to issue declaratory relief when the plaintiff claims a state statute is an unconstitutionally overbroad restriction on
Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293 (1943); Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of America,

316 U.S. 491 (1942).
55. See Borchard, Discretion to Refuse Jurisdiction of Actions for Declaratory
Judgments, 26 MINN. L. REV. 677 (1942). The standard of the Uniform Declaratory
Judgment Act provides:
[t]he court may refuse to render or enter a declaratory judgment or decree
where such judgment or decree, if rendered or issued, would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding.
UNIFORM DECLARATORY JUDGMENT

AcT § 6.

56. Public Serv. Comm'n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 247 (1952); Great Lakes

Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293 (1943).

57. Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of America, 316 U.S. 491, 495 (1942). See
Developments in the Law, supra note 49, at 814-15.
58. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961); United Public Workers of America v.
Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947); Exparte La Prade, 289 U.S. 444 (1933). The requirement has been loosened in recent years. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968);
Gardner v. Toilet Goods Ass'n, 387 U.S. 167 (1967); Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
59. 312 U.S. 270 (1941).
60. Id. at 273.
61. But see Borchard, Challenging "Penal" Statutes by Declaratory Action, 52
YALE L.J. 445 (1943).
62. 389 U.S. 241 (1967).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol42/iss4/3
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freedom of speech. The other was that a request for declaratory relief
should be considered independently of the propriety of injunctive relief.
The Court's sanction of independent consideration of declaratory
relief established the declaratory judgment as a remedy against unconstitutional state statutes that is distinct from and more available than the
injunction. However, it should be noted that the Court denied declaratory
relief in the second Zwickler decision63 upon finding the lack of a ripe
controversy. The Court cited the standard of Maryland Casualty,64 but
failed to establish further guidelines for determining the existence of a ripe
controversy. The Court thus retained the discretionary power to deny
declaratory relief while indicating an activist policy towards its availability.
In the Zwickler cases a foundation was laid by the Court for expansion
of the use of the declaratory judgment against the enforcement of state
criminal statutes. The Younger-Samuels decisions, by a later Court with a
more restrained view toward its judicial function, will be the next subject of
discussion.
IV.

"OUR FEDERALISM"-THE YOUNGER-SAMUELS DECISIONS

65
In 1971, the Supreme Court handed down a series of decisions
indicating a retreat from the activist philosophy of Dombrowski in regard to
federal interference with state criminal proceedings. Although the cases
left numerous issues unresolved, they established a policy of reliance on
and respect for the state in protection of individual constitutional rights.
66
In Younger v. Harris
four plaintiffs sought to enjoin the pending
prosecution of one for violation of the California Criminal Syndicalism
Act 67 on the ground that it was an unconstitutionally overbroad and vague
restriction on freedom of expression. The Supreme Court dismissed three
plaintiffs who failed to allege either threatened or pending prosecution for
lack of a live controversy with the state. 68 It then reversed the district
court's grant of injunctive relief and held that federal courts should not
enjoin pending state criminal proceedings absent a showing of irreparable
injury.69 It based the decision on "Our Federalism," a "longstanding public
70
policy against federal court interference with state court proceedings"
7
72
71
derived from principles of equity, comity, and federalism.

63. Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103 (1969).
64. 312 U.S. 270 (1941). See note 60 and accompanying text supra.
65. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66
(1971); Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971);
Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200 (1971); Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216 (1971).
66. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
67. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11400, 11401 (West 1970).
68. 401 U.S. 37, 41-42 (1971).
69. Id. at 53-54.
70. Id. at 43.
71. [T]he basic doctrine of equity jurisprudence [is] that courts of
equity should not act to restrain a criminal prosecution, when the moving
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1977
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Younger was significant in several respects. First, it set standards for
determining the existence of the necessary irreparable injury for federal
injunctive relief against pending state criminal proceedings, i.e., prosecutions brought in bad faith and harassment, prosecutions brought on state
law that is "flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions," and other unspecified unusual circumstances.7 4 The standards
are highly discretionary, but the Court clearly established a restrained
approach to federal intervention. Second, it approved the holding in Dombrowski as an example of bad faith prosecution. However, the Court expressly rejected the contention that Dombrowski provided authority for
injunctive relief against a good faith attempt to enforce a state statute upon
a showing that the statute was an unconstitutionally overbroad or vague
restriction on the freedom of speech. 75 This effectively limited Dombrowski
as a vehicle for expansion of federal intervention in pending criminal
proceedings. Third, it implicitly abandoned the rule of In re Sawyer 76 which
absolutely banned federal injunctive relief against pending state proceedings. Although the Dombrowski decision did in fact enjoin a pending proceeding, the Court maintained that because the original federal complaint
preceded state indictments, there was no interference with a pending
proceeding. The Younger standards recognized the possibility of circumstances in which federal interference in pending state criminal proceedings
would be proper.
In Samuels v. Mackel177 the Court considered the availability of a declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of a state statute being enforced
in a pending criminal proceeding. It held that the Younger standards for
party has an adequate remedy at law and will not suffer irreparable injury
if denied equitable relief.
Id. at 43-44. See notes 22-25 and accompanying text supra.

72. Comity in general terms is the respect of one judicial system for the

function of another judicial system. In the context of Younger-Samuels, it is the

respect of federal courts for the proper jurisdiction of state courts and a recognidon that state courts are obligated and entrusted to protect federal constitutional

rights.
73. Federalism is our structure of independent national and state governments. In Younger the Court recognized

[the] fact that the entire country is made up of a Union of separate State
governments, and . . . the belief that the National Government will fare
best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform their

separate functions in their separate ways.... [Federalism] is a system in

which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and
National Governments, and in which the National Government, anxious
though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal
interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere
with the legitimate activities of the States.

401 U.S. at 44.
74. 401 U.S. at 53-54.
75. Id. at 53.
76. 124 U.S. 200 (1888). See notes 12-13 and accompanying text supra.
77. 401 U.S. 66 (1971).
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injunctive relief were equally applicable to declaratory relief.7s The holding was based on the Court's finding that "ordinarily a declaratory judgment will result in precisely the same interference with and disruption of
state proceedings that the long standing policy limiting injunctions was
designed to avoid., 79 That interference would result either from the federal court's enforcement of the declaratory judgment by granting an injunction as further relief to "protect and effectuate" the judgment 0 or from
the state court's acceptance of the res judicata effect of the federal judg8
ment. 1
The Samuels approach contravenes legislative intent and judicial interpretation establishing the declaratory judgment as a unique statutory
remedy not governed by traditional equitable principles.8 2 However, the
consideration of the practical effect of the relief granted is persuasive. The
theory of the declaratory judgment is that it provides a milder remedy than
the injunction. If its effect is the same, there is no justification for greater
availability of declaratory relief. The premise of Younger that federal
courts should exercise restraint in this area dictated the extension of the
Younger standards to declaratory judgments.
The Court in Samuels did recognize the possibility of "unusual circumstances" where a strong claim for federal relief could be better served by a
declaratory judgment than by an injunction which might be "particularly
intrusive or offensive." 83 This recognition should not increase the availability of declaratory relief beyond the standards of Younger-Samuels. It only
suggests that when federal intervention is appropriate under YoungerSamuels, a declaratory judgment might be a less offensive remedy than an
injunction while accomplishing the same result. Nevertheless, the Court's
language provides some basis for arguing that declaratory relief should be
more available than injunctive relief against pending state criminal proceedings.
The Younger-Samuels decisions provide a general rule that injunctive
and declaratory relief is not available against pending state criminal proceedings absent a showing of irreparable injury. Both opinions were
phrased in prohibitory terms and offer little guidance for determining
when the necessary irreparable injury is present. As discussed above,
78. Id. at 73.
79. Id. at 53-54.
80. 28 U.S.C. § 2202 (1970).
81. The resjudicataeffect of a federal judgment extends only to the parties to
it. United States ex rel. Lawrence v. Woods, 432 F.2d 1072, 1075-76 (7th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 983 (1971). However it would probably be futile for a state to
continue prosecution. Commonwealth v. Masskow, 362 Mass. 662, 290 N.E.2d 154,
157 (1972). But see People v. Glass, 353 N.E.2d 214 (1976). A convicted party could,
after exhausting state remedies, sue for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court.
Vuitch v. Hardy, 473 F.2d 1370 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 824 (1973);
Harling v. Dept. of Health and Social Services, 323 F. Supp. 899 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
82. See notes 49-55 and accompanying text supra.
83. 401 U.S. 66, 73 (1971).
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Younger attempted to set standards in recognizing three exceptions when
federal intervention would be appropriate.
The first exception was upon a showing of bad faith and harassment in
the state prosecution. In Perez v. Ledesma s4 the Court's example of bad faith
and harassment was "prosecutions undertaken by state officials in bad faith
without hope of obtaining valid convictions. .

. ."

Two federal courts have

used this exception to enjoin pending state criminal proceedings. In Krahm
v. Graham 5 the Ninth Circuit found bad faith in multiple prosecutions
under an anti-obscenity statute. The defendant had successfully defended
in a similar prosecution but the state persisted in filing additional charges.
The court held that the case fit within Younger's strictly construed version
of Dombrowski. In contrast, the Seventh Circuit in Grandco Corp. v. Rochford"6 refused to find bad faith in multiple prosecutions when previous
prosecutions resulted in successful convictions. The distinction was that the
previous convictions in Grandco gave the prosecutors reason to expect
successful future convictions.
Another example of bad faith prosecutions within the Younger-Samuels
exception is InternationalSociety for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Conlisk.S7
An Illinois federal district court found bad faith and harassment in police
misconduct and multiple prosecutions under a municipal ordinance constitutionally inapplicable to the plaintiffs' religious activities. These cases
indicate that multiple prosecutions under circumstances in which authorities cannot reasonably expect valid convictions constitute bad faith
and justify federal intervention.
The question remains whether a single prosecution brought in bad
faith justifies federal intervention. The basis of the Younger decision was
that a defense raised against a single criminal prosecution in state court
adequately protected federal constitutional rights, and that the prosecution
did not constitute irreparable injury. Therefore, it could be argued that
Younger requires multiple prosecutions as a prerequisite to federal intervention. However, it is doubtful that the Court intended such an interpretation. Implicit in its finding that the Younger plaintiff did not show bad
faith in his single state prosecution is the belief that if he had, federal
intervention would have been appropriate. It is likely that federal relief
against a single bad faith prosecution is available, but without multiple
prosecutions the element of bad faith is more difficult to demonstrate.
In attempting to prove bad faith, plaintiffs commonly allege police and
84. 401 U.S. 82, 85 (1971). The Court reversed a district court judgment
ordering the suppression and return of seized material being held as evidence in a
pending state criminal proceeding. Using the Samuels practical effect approach and
finding that such an order would halt the state proceedings, the Court applied the
Younger standards for federal intervention.
85. 461 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1972).
86. 536 F.2d 197 (7th Cir. 1976).
87. 374 F. Supp. 1010 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
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prosecutorial misconduct. The illegal search and seizures and the resulting
threats of the prosecutor in Dombrowski were accepted in Younger as an
example of bad faith. It appears, however, that the Court has since directed
federal courts to look with restraint upon allegations of bad faith based
8
upon such misconduct. In Hicks v. Miranda"
the Court rejected a district
court finding of bad faith in police seizures as "vague and conclusory." The
Seventh Circuit cited Hicks in Grandco Corp. v. Rochfords9 and found illegal

searches and seizures to be isolated and remediable in state court. Thus, in
order to establish police or prosecutorial misconduct, it may be necessary
that the activity either rise to the level of that in Dombrowski,9" or take place
in conjunction with multiple prosecutions.
The second exception recognized in Younger was that federal injunctive relief would be appropriate if the state prosecution was based on a
statute that was "flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional
prohibitions in every clause, sentence and paragraph, and in whatever
manner and against whomever any effort might be made to apply it."'" It is
difficult to imagine a prosecution under such a statute that would not also
constitute bad faith and harassment, i.e., prosecution without hope of
obtaining a valid conviction. This language from an earlier case 92 may have
been quoted to reinforce the history behind the Court's holding. However,
this exception could be independently significant in a suit to enjoin a single
prosecution by overcoming the inference that multiple prosecutions are
necessary to show bad faith. No federal court has specifically applied this
exception. In Callahan v. Sanders93 an Alabama federal district court enjoined the pending prosecution of traffic cases under a statutory procedure previously held to be unconstitutional. The court issued the injunction without discussion of Younger principles, but the previous judgment of
unconstitutionality could be considered to have made the statutory procedure "flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional provisions." This case is an unusual example of the exception because the
unconstitutional statute provided the procedure for prosecution and not the
substantive basis for prosecution.
The final exception recognized in Younger was that "other unusual
circumstances calling for federal intervention might also arise, but there is
no point in our attempting now to specify what they might be. 94 This
exception enabled the Court to retain discretionary power to increase the
88. 422 U.S. 332, 350 (1975).
89. 536 F.2d 197 (7th Cir. 1976). See Eagle Books, Inc. v. Reinhard, 418 F.
Supp. 345 (N.D. Ill. 1976).
90. 380 U.S. 479, 487-88 (1965). See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 48

(1971).
91. 401 U.S. at 53-54 (1971).
92. Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 402 (1941).
93. 339 F. Supp. 814 (M.D. Ala. 1971); Bennett v. Cottingham, 290 F. Supp.

759 (N.D. Ala. 1968) (three judge court), aff'd, 393 U.S. 317 (1969). See also Hulett
v. Julian, 250 F. Supp. 208 (M.D. Ala. 1966) (three judge court).
94. 401 U.S. at 54 (1971).
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availability of relief in the future by finding additional "unusual circumstances." In Kugler v. Helfant9 5 a plaintiff sought to enjoin pending state
criminal proceedings based on the "unusual circumstances" exception. A
former New Jersey municipal court judge claimed he could not receive a
fair trial in a state court system administered by the New Jersey Supreme
Court because members of that court had coerced his previous grand jury
testimony. The Supreme Court denied relief after examination of the facts,
but reaffirmed the "unusual circumstances" exception and
suggested that
96
bias in the state tribunal would fit within the exception.
At present, the three exceptions recognized in Younger do not make
federal relief against pending state criminal proceedings readily available.
However, the exceptions are broad enough to provide a vehicle for expansion of future availability. The initiative for such an expansion of federal
relief will have to come from the Supreme Court. Lower federal courts have
strictly followed Younger and seldom issue injunctive or declaratory relief
based on one of the exceptions. Aside from the cases discussed above, there
has been only one instance of federal intervention. In Gilliardv. Carson97 a
Florida federal district court enjoined pending municipal court prosecutions in which indigent defendants facing possible prison terms were denied the right to counsel. The court stated that the threat of deprivation of
liberty was sufficient irreparable injury to enjoin a pending state criminal
proceeding. As most criminal defendants are threatened with deprivation
of liberty, the court's view seems to conflict with the Younger principle that
a single defense against criminal charges is not irreparable injury. Two
factors, however, distinguish Gilliardfrom Younger. First, Gilliard involved
the protection of the procedural due process right to counsel while Younger
involved a substantive constitutional attack on a criminal statute. Second,
the purpose of the Gilliard injunction was not to stop a pending state
proceeding, but to force the prosecutor to respect the indigent defendants'
right to counsel in those proceedings.
Considering these differences, it is unlikely that Gilliard will establish the threat of deprivation of liberty as an additional exception to
Younger. It could be argued, however, that in view of Gilliardand Callahan9" injunctive relief is available without application of a Younger exception when the complaint is that a procedural defect in the state judicial
system makes the pending proceeding unconstitutional. In such circumstances, federal interference with the independent function of the state
courts is less offensive than in a substantive attack on a state criminal
statute. The effect of the injunction is not to terminate the state proceeding, but to insure that the proceeding is conducted in a manner which
protects the defendant's right to procedural due process.
95. 421 U.S. 117 (1975).

96. Id. at 124-25 n.4.
97. 348 F. Supp. 757 (M.D. Fla. 1972).
98. 339 F. Supp 814 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
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One other vehicle for possible expansion of the availability of federal
relief is the use of the class action. The plaintiffs in the class action, who
would be subjected to multiple prosecutions in state courts, could argue
that the collective burden of multiple defenses constitutes irreparable injury under the Younger "unusual circumstances" exception. In the famous
abortion case of Roe v. Wade9 9 the Court noted that a class action might
effect the application of Younger-Samuels principles, but found that the
plaintiff's complaint failed to assert representation of a class. Since Roe no
federal court has ruled on the effect of a class action suit. It is doubtful that
a class action to enjoin pending criminal prosecutions will become an
additional exception to the Younger-Samuels rule of nonintervention. The
Court's commitment to the principles of Younger-Samuels is too strong to be
overcome by a plaintiff simply seeking relief on behalf of all persons
subject to similar prosecutions. The existence of a class action could,
however, be one factor weighing in favor of federal intervention in specific
cases which might otherwise present a strong claim for federal relief.
The Younger-Samuels decisions ° ° were an expression of policy on the
subject of federal interference with state court proceedings by a Supreme
Court more inclined toward judicial restraint than its predecessor. It specifically set standards applicable only to federal intervention in pending
state criminal proceedings, but in so doing established a policy, "Our
Federalism," with the potential for a broad impact on the relationship
between state and federal courts. The decisions left a number of questions
unresolved: the application of the Anti-Injunction Statute, the availability
of relief against threatened criminal proceedings, the availability of relief
against pending and threatened civil proceedings, and the availability of
relief against administrative proceedings. The efforts of the Court to
answer these questions and the implications of "Our Federalism" on those
answers will be discussed in the following sections.
V.

THE FEDERAL ANTI-INJUNCTION STATUTE

The Federal Anti-Injunction Statute has existed, in some form, since
1793."0l Its original legislative history is unclear, but the Court has construed it to represent a policy of "preventing needless friction between state
and federal courts."' 2 In Younger it was cited as a source of the "Our
99. 410 U.S. 113, 127 n.7 (1973).
100. The Court remanded two of the cases with similar factual patterns as
Younger for consideration in light of Younger. Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200 (1971);
Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216 (1971). In the remaining case, the Court reversed

the district court's grant of injunctive relief for lack of irreparable injury. Boyle v.
Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971).

101. Act of March 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 5, 1 Stat. 334.
102. Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 309 U.S. 4,9 (1940).
See Durfee & Sloss, FederalInjunctions Against Proceedingsin State Courts: The Life
History of a Statute, 30 MIcH. L. RFv. 1145 (1932). Compare Note, FederalCourt Stays
of State Court Proceedings: A Reexamination of OriginalCongressional Intent, 38 U.
CHI. L. REv. 612 (1971).
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Federalism" doctrine. 0 3 The statute's actual effectiveness as a bar to injunctive relief has been continually diminished by legislative and judicial
exceptions. 10 4 An attempt by the Court to strengthen the statute in Toucey
v. New York Life Insurance Co.10 5 was rejected when Congress tried to
restore the statute to its pre-Toucey status in the 1948 revision of the
Judicial Code.10 6 That version remains with us today and provides:
A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to
stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by
Act of Congress, or where necessary10 in
aid of its jurisdiction, or to
7
protect or effectuate its judgments.
The statute prohibits a federal court from enjoining pending state court
08
proceedings,1
subject to exceptions. By its express terms, the statute does
not apply to forms of relief other
than injunctions or to injunctions against
10 9
threatened state proceedings.
In Mitchum v. Foster"' the Court held that suits for injunctive relief
under the Civil Rights Acts of 18711" (hereinafter referred to as "section
1983 suits") were "expressly authorized by Act of Congress" and therefore
within the exception to the Anti-Injunction Statute. Almost all suits for
injunctive relief against pending state criminal proceedings are section
1983 suits. Thus, the decision effectively eliminated the statute as a barrier
to injunctive relief against pending state criminal proceedings.
In Mitchum the Court refused to apply the Anti-Injunction Statute to
section 1983 suits and thereby place a near absolute prohibition on federal
injunctions against pending state criminal proceedings. That refusal implicitly recognized that there are circumstances when federal intervention
is appropriate. The Court thus retained the power to grant injunctive relief
upon a finding of irreparable injury in accordance with the Younger
standards. This was a departure from the absolute ban on federal intervention imposed from In re Sawyer" 2 until Dombrowski"' and reflected in the
policy of the Anti-Injunction Statute. Although the present Court shows no
103. In a peculiar display of judicial reasoning, Justice Black cited the AntiInjunction Statute as a basis of the policy of "Our Federalism", then reserved
consideration of whether the statute was applicable to the case. Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37, 54 (1971).
104. See Durfee & Sloss, supra, note 102 at 1145; Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S.
225, 233-36 (1972). See note 180 infra.
105. 314 U.S. 118 (1941).
106. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970) (reviser's note).
107. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970).
108. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 228-29 (1972).
109. See Whitten, FederalDeclaratory and Injunctive Interference with State Court
Proceedings: The Supreme Court and the Limits of JudicialDiscretion, 53 N. CAR. L.
REv. 591, 639-42, 672-75 (1975).
110. 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
111. Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
1983 (1970)). See note 152, infra.
112. 124 U.S. 200 (1888).
113. 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
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inclination to look favorably upon federal injunctions against pending state
criminal proceedings and continually emphasizes respect for the functions
of the state courts, Younger and Mitchum have established a discretionary
power in the federal courts to grant such injunctive relief.
The Anti-Injunction Statute remains a potential obstacle to federal
injunctive relief against pending state civil proceedings. Mitchum exempted only section 1983 suits from the prohibition of the statute. A suit for
federal intervention not based on section 1983114 is still prohibited unless it
falls within one of the express exceptions in that statute or within one of the
numerous other statutory or judicially recognized exceptions.1 5 Thus, the
Anti-Injunction Statute maintains some measure of vitality in regard to
injunctive relief against pending state civil proceedings.
VI.

FEDERAL INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AGAINST THREATENED
STATE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS

As discussed earlier, the Court in the Younger-Samuels decisions expressed "no view about the circumstances under which federal courts may
act when there is no prosecution pending in state courts at the time the
federal proceeding is begun."1' 16 This was surprising in view of the fact that
cases cited by the Court as the foundation of "Our Federalism" involved
threatened criminal proceedings. 1 7 Historically, relief against pending
criminal proceedings had been absolutely barred." 8 Nevertheless, the
Court clearly left open the issue of availability of injunctive and declaratory
relief against threatened criminal prosecutions.
The first indication of the Court's resolution of this issue came in Lake
Carriers'Association v. MacMullan." 9 The Court withheld declaratory relief
against threatened proceedings on the grounds of abstention, 120 but expressed the view that the Younger-Samuels decisions were
114. The basis of such a suit for injunctive relief would presumably be either a
combination of the equity and federal question jurisdiction of federal courts or
some arguable statutory authority not yet recognized by the Court. Regardless of
the basis for the suit, injunctive relief would be barred by the Anti-Injunction
Statute unless it was within a statutory or judicially recognized exception to the

statute.
115. See note 180 infra.
116. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971).
117. Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943); Watson v. Buck, 313
U.S. 387 (1941); Beal v. Missouri P.R.R. Co., 312 U.S. 45 (1941); Spielman Motor
Sales Co. v. Dodge, 295 U.S. 89 (1935); Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240 (1926); Ex
parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
118. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965); Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123
(1908); In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200 (1888).
119. 406 U.S. 498 (1972).
120. The abstention doctrine of Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496
(1941), is sometimes confused with Younger-Samuels standards. Abstention dictates
that a federal court should delay ruling on a constitutional issue until the parties
resolve a state law question in state court. It is appropriate only when: the court is
faced with a constitutional issue and state law issue; the decision on state law may
resolve the case; and the state law is unclear. See Field, Abstention in Constitutional
Cases: The Scope of the PullmanAbstention Doctrine, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1071 (1974).
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premised on considerations of equity practice and comity in our
federal system that have little force in the absence of a pending
state proceeding. .

.

.[The] exercise of federal court jurisdiction

ordinarily is appropriate
if the conditions for declaratory or in121
junctive relief are met.

These words forecast the decisions in Steffel v. Thompson 122 and Doran
v.Salem Inn, Inc.121 In Steffel the Court held that the Younger-Samuels
standards did not govern the availability of declaratory relief against
threatened criminal proceedings:
[Flederal declaratory relief is not precluded when no state prosecution is pending and a federal plaintiff demonstrates a genuine
threat of enforcement of a disputed state criminal statute,
whether an attack is made
on the constitutionality of the statute on
24
its face or as applied.1

Although Steffel elaborately distinguished the declaratory judgment
and injunction as distinct remedies,' 25 Doran held that the Younger-Samuels
standards also did not govern the availability of preliminary injunctive
relief against threatened criminal proceedings. 26 In accordance with traditional equitable standards, the Court affirmed the issuance of a preliminary injunction to protect plaintiff's interest during a suit for declaratory
relief. The Court did not specifically hold that the Younger-Samuels standards do not apply to permanent injunctive relief against threatened criminal prosecutions and did refer to the injunction as "stronger" relief than a
declaratory judgment. 27 Thus the argument may be made that the Younger-Samuels standards should apply to permanent injunctive relief against
threatened criminal prosecutions. However, the Court has continually recognized that "the practical effect of the two forms of relief would be
virtually identical,"'12 and the logical conclusion, buttressed by Doran, is
that if the principles of "Our Federalism" and standards of YoungerSamuels do not apply to declaratory relief against a threatened criminal
prosecution, they also should not apply to injunctive relief.
In Maynard v. Wooley 129 the New Hampshire federal district court
apparently accepted this conclusion without discussion of the issue. It cited
Steffel and Doran in issuing a permanent injunction against a threatened
criminal prosecution under a state statute prohibiting the covering of the
words "Live Free or Die" on automobile license plates.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

406 U.S. at 509.
415 U.S. 452 (1974).
422 U.S. 922 (1975).
415 U.S. 452, 475 (1974).
Id. at 466-73.
422 U.S. 922 (1975).
Id.

128. Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 73 (1971). See also Doran v. Salem Inn,
Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 931 (1975).
129. 406 F. Supp. 1381 (D.N.H. 1976) (three judge court).
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The use of the threatened/pending distinction to limit the availability

of federal intervention has been justified on a number of grounds. One is
the belief that injunctive or declaratory relief against threatened proceed-

ings is less of an intrusion into the authority of a state criminal justice
system than such relief against pending proceedings. In Steffel, the Court
said:
[w]hen no state criminal proceeding is pending at the time the

federal complaint is filed, federal intervention does not result in
duplicative legal proceedings or the disruption of the state criminal justice system; nor can federal intervention in that circumstance
the state court's abilibe interpreted as reflecting negatively upon
3
ty to enforce constitutional principles.' e

Practically, it is likely that the degree of disruption to the state criminal
justice system would not vary greatly merely because the process has passed
from the threatened to the pending stage. In most cases, the difference
between a threatened proceeding and a pending proceeding is that the
prosecutor has filed charges-a significant event for the accused, but a
relatively simple step in criminal procedure. It would be unusual if a
federal court were asked to enjoin a pending proceeding which had progressed beyond the initial step of filing charges. Thus, the disruption would
not be to a state court proceeding, but to the state law enforcement system:
the police and the local prosecutors. The disruption would be the same
whether the police and prosecutors are enjoined from filing charges
against a particular person or taking a previously charged person to trial.
In each instance, they are forbidden to enforce the state criminal law.
A second justification offered for the threatened/pending distinction
is the recognition of "the paramount role Congress has assigned to the
federal courts to protect constitutional rights"' 3' under the Civil Rights Act.
The Supreme Court is the final authority on constitutional questions, but
state and federal courts are equally obligated to protect constitutional
rights. If state courts provide that protection, then the availability of state
injunctive and declaratory relief plus the respect for the state criminal
justice system in "Our Federalism" should emphasize federal1 32restraint in
the area of threatened proceedings, not federal intervention.
Implicit in the refusal to place Younger-Samuels standards on the
availability of federal intervention against threatened proceedings is the
belief that the states do not afford adequate protection of constitutional
rights. Even if true, this belief should be tempered by the "Our Federalism"
doctrine to provide standards requiring a demonstration of inadequate
state protection before federal intervention. Instead, the standards of
Steffel and Doran seem to be the traditional requirements for declaratory
130. 415 U.S. 452, 462 (1974).
131. Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 104 (1971) (separate opinion of Brennan,
132. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 472 (1974).
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and injunctive relief.13 3 These standards give federal courts a largely discretionary power to intervene in this sensitive area.
However deficient traditional equitable principles may be in determining when federal intervention should be available, they do provide the best
justification for the threatened/pending distinction. The threatened party
is without an adequate legal remedy because there is no legal proceeding.
The party is without a forum in which to claim a violation of his constitutional rights. This calls for some form of declaratory or injunctive relief,
either federal or state. The availability of federal relief should be governed
by weighing the necessity for federal court protection of constitutional
rights against the principles of respect for the function of state courts in
"Our Federalism." In Steffel and Doran the Court placed more weight on
federal protection of constitutional rights.
The application of the threatened/pending distinction raises a number
of other problems. One problem is deciding when the federal court should
34
determine if state court proceedings are pending. From In re Sawyer'
through Steffel the point of determination seemed to be the date on which
the federal complaint was filed. The first modification of this view occurred in Hicks v. Miranda.135 The Court held that when state criminal
proceedings are begun against the federal plaintiff after the federal complaint is filed but "before any proceedings of substance on the merits have
taken place in federal courts," the principles of Younger v. Harris should
apply.' 36 This placed the point of determination sometime after the suit
was filed in federal court, although the Court offered no definition of
"proceedings of substance on the merits."'' 3 7
The application of this rule imposes a major limitation on the availability of federal intervention against threatened state criminal proceedings
under Steffel and Doran. The state prosecutor may change the status of the
federal plaintiff from threatened with prosecution to subject to a pending
prosecution by filing criminal charges in state court after he receives
service of the federal complaint. The federal court would be forced to
dismiss the complaint under Younger-Samuels principles of non-interfer133. See notes 142-49 and accompanying text infra.
134. 124 U.S. 200 (1888).
135. 422 U.S. 332 (1975). See Modern Social Educ., Inc. v. Preller, 353 F. Supp.
173 (D. Md. 1973).
136. Id. at 349. The actual time sequence in the case was:
Nov. 29-petition for temporary restraining order in federal court,
Dec. 28-denial of request for temporary restraining order,
Jan. 8-convening of three judge district court,
Jan. 14-service of federal complaint,
Jan. 15--charges brought in state court.
137. The Court adopted a similar view one week later in Doran v. Salem Inn,
Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 929 (1975). It found a state prosecution initiated one day after
service of the federal complaint to be a pending prosecution because "the federal
litigation was in an embryonic stage and no contested matter had been decided."
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ence with pending state criminal proceedings. The result is a de facto
power in the state prosecutor to remove to state court an action brought in
federal court by a threatened party.
The dissent in Hicks 118 argued that the rule "trivializes" Steffel. Actually, it gives the state prosecutor the power to deny federal jurisdiction, but
insures that the threatened party will have an opportunity to raise his
claim. The fact that the opportunity will be in the form of a defense to a
criminal charge in state court is merely in accordance with the principles in
"Our Federalism" of respect for the functions of state courts. The decision
maintains the availability of federal relief if no charges are filed or the
Younger-Samuels standards of irreparable injury are met.
Another problem arising from the threatened/pending distinction occurs when a party subject to a pending criminal prosecution joins with a
threatened party to seek relief in federal court.'39 The Court faced this
situation in Doran and stated that "each of the [individual petitioners]
should be placed in the position required by [Younger-Samuels and Steffel]
as if that [petitioner] stood along."' 4 ° It dismissed the party subject to a
pending prosecution on Younger grounds and affirmed injunctive relief
for the threatened parties.
Although the rule in Doran seems clear, its application is subject to the
power under Hicks' 4 1 of the state prosecutor to change the status of the
threatened party to a party facing pending prosecution. The state prosecutor could file charges against all federal plaintiffs and force the federal
court to deny relief under Younger-Samuels standards. The originally
threatened party would then have a forum in state court to litigate his
constitutional claim.
Assuming Steffel and Doran effectively prevent the application of
Younger-Samuels standards, and the state prosecutor does not respond to
the federal complaint by filing criminal charges, the issue becomes what
standards remain to govern the availability of injunctive and declaratory
relief against threatened state proceedings. Steffel held that "federal declaratory relief is not precluded when. . . a federal plaintiff demonstrates
a genuine threat of enforcement of a disputed state criminal statute."' 42 The
138. Id. at 353.
139. The existence of a pending prosecution against a party not involved in the
federal suit would also raise problems due to the possible effect of a federal decision
on the state proceeding. However, it is likely that the interests of the federal
plaintiff threatened with prosecution compel the availability of federal relief. See
Note, FederalRelief Against ThreatenedState Prosecutions:The Implicationsof Younger,
Lake Carriersand Roe, 48 N.Y.U.L. REv. 965, 980-82 (1973).
140. 422 U.S. 922, 929 (1975).
141. 422 U.S. 922 (1975). The rule in Hicks, issued just one week before Doran,
seems to be absolute. However, the Court noted that the threatened party had a
"substantial stake in the state proceeding" and the interest of the threatened parties
with the state defendants were "intertwined". Id. at 348.
142. 415 U.S. 452, 475 (1974).
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Court made no attempt to further specify the standards for granting
declaratory relief. In so doing, it impliedly 14accepted
the pre-Younger3
Samuels standard of sound judicial discretion.
It is likely that the Maryland Casualty144 test of "substantial controversy"
will continue to be cited as the basis for determining when declaratory
relief is appropriate. It also appears that the Court has accepted preYounger-Samuels standards for determining when injunctive relief is available against threatened state criminal proceedings. In Doran, the Court
held that preliminary injunctive relief was not subject to Younger-Samuels
standards and stated that "a plaintiff may challenge the constitutionality of
the state statute in federal court, assuming he can satisfy the requirements
for federal jurisdiction."' 4 5 The "requirements for federal jurisdiction"
were not specified, but one may reasonably conclude that the Court was
referring to the traditional equitable prerequisites for preliminary
relief,
146
i.e., irreparable injury and likelihood of success on the merits.
If Doran is extended to permanent injunctive relief, it would follow
that the "requirements for federal jurisdiction" should be the same traditional equitable prerequisites. 147 Of course, the traditional equitable principle of irreparable injury is much broader and more likely to be found in
the discretion of a148 court than the limited Younger-Samuels concept of
irreparable injury.
The decisions in Steffel and Doran appear to make declaratory and
injunctive relief against threatened state criminal proceedings available
under traditional discretionary standards, but it would probably be a mistake to conclude that these remedies are now readily available. The standards of Younger-Samuels may not apply, but the impact of "Our Federalism" should remain a restraining influence on lower federal courts. Additionally, Steffel and Doran expressly dealt only with the Younger-Samuels
decisions. It is arguable that earlier decisions 149 requiring restraint in relief
against threatened criminal proceedings may someday be resurrected to
148. See notes 54-60 and accompanying text supra. Justice Brennan summarized the standard for granting declaratory relief against threatened criminal
prosecution as
[o]rdinarily a declaratory judgment will be appropriate if the case-orcontroversy requirements of Article III are met, if the narrow special
factors warranting federal abstention are absent, and if the declaration will
serve a useful purpose in resolving the dispute.
Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 122-23 (1971) (Brennan, J., separate opinion).
144. 312 U.S. 270 (1941). See notes 59-60 and accompanying text supra.
145. 422 U.S. 922, 930 (1975).
146. Id. at 931.
147. See notes 22-27 and accompanying text supra.
148. Compare notes 26-27 and accompanying text supra with notes 84-99 and
accompanying text supra.
149. Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943); Watson v. Buck, 313
U.S. 387 (1941); Beal v. Missouri P.R.R. Co., 312 U.S. 45 (1941); Spielman Motor
Sales Co. v. Dodge, 295 U.S. 89 (1935); Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240 (1926); Ex
parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
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impose further restriction on the availability of injunctive and declaratory
relief. Younger-Samuels clearly ushered in a new era in federal intervention,
but it was built on earlier decisions which still may maintain some vitality in
regard to threatened criminal proceedings. For the present, however, the
Supreme Court has granted federal courts the discretionary power, subject
to the application of Hicks v. Miranda, to grant injunctive and declaratory
relief against threatened state criminal proceedings.
VII.

FEDERAL DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AGAINST
PENDING AND THREATENED CIVIL PROCEEDINGS

A.

Pending Civil Proceedings

The Younger-Samuels decisions did not deal with the issue of standards
governing federal intervention in state civil proceedings. After those decisions, the Court continued to reserve consideration of the question, 50 until
a partial answer was provided in Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.' In a section
1983 suit152 seeking injunctive and declaratory relief against an Ohio public
nuisance statute restricting the showing of obscene films, the Court held
the Younger standards applicable to a pending civil proceeding if the state
was a party and if the proceeding was "akin to a criminal prosecution" and
"both in aid of and closely related to criminal statutes. 153 The Court made
154
no pronouncement on the application of Younger to other civil litigation.
The limited holding in Huffman poses a major problem in determining what types of civil proceedings fall within the category of "akin to
criminal" and "in aid of and closely related to criminal statutes." Aside
from the challenged public nuisance proceeding, the decision did not
indicate instances in which the Younger standards would be applicable.
Lower federal courts have used different approaches and reached contrasting results in deciding whether intervention in civil proceedings is
governed by Huffman.
In Burdick v. Miech155 a three judge district court stated that Huffman
150. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975); Speight v. Slaton, 415 U.S. 333 (1974);
Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973); Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
Three circuit courts have applied Younger-Samuels to pending state circuit proceedings. See Duke v. Texas, 477 F.2d 244 (5th Cir. 1973); Lynch v. Snepp, 472 F.2d 769
(4th Cir. 1973); Cousins v. Wigoda, 463 F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1972).
151. 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
152. A suit under the Civil Rights Act of 1871. The act in its present form
provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or any person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in
an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
153. 420 U.S. 592, 604-05 (1975).
154. Id. at 607.
155. 409 F. Supp. 982 (E.D. Wis. 1975) (three judge court).
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is likely to be every bit as great as it

would be were [it] a criminal proceeding,"' 15 6 and found a Wisconsin statute
authorizing compulsory questioning of unwed mothers concerning the
father's identity and the child's conception to be within the Huffman rule.
However, in Doe v. Norton 157 another three judge district court found a

similar Connecticut statute not to be "in aid of and closely related to
criminal statutes, '' 15s and refused to apply Huffman.
One area of general agreement is that state bar disciplinary proceedings fall within the Huffman holding.'59 Other applications of Huffman
have resulted in the dismissal of suits in federal court to enjoin state court
proceedings in false, misleading, and deceptive conduct charges, 160 a zoning action, 161 a divorce action, 162 and a regulation of yard signs case. 163 On
the other hand, courts have held that Huffman does not bar federal
intervention in suits to enjoin state court proceedings
under civil commit1 66
165
and extradition statutes.
ment, 164 attachment,
The problem in the application of Huffman is the Supreme Court's
failure to specify objective standards for the application of the rule. The
impression is that the Court intended to limit its holding on the application
of the Younger-Samuels standards to pending civil proceedings. However,
Justice Brennan's dissent in Huffman expressed the fear that the decision
was the first step towards application of those standards to all civil proceedings.' 67 He maintained that the Younger-Samuels standards resulted from
156. Id. at 984-85.
157. 365 F. Supp. 65 (D. Conn. 1973) (three judge court), vacated, 422 U.S. 391
(1975), on remand, Doe v. Maher, 414 F. Supp. 1368 (D. Conn. 1976).
158. 414 F. Supp. at 1373.
159. Anonymous v. Ass'n of the Bar, 515 F.2d 427 (2d Cir. 1975); Erdmann v.
Stevens, 458 F.2d 1205 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 889 (1972); Mildner v.
Gulotta, 405 F. Supp. 182 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (three judge court), affl'd, 425 U.S. 901
(1976). See also, Niles v. Lowe, 407 F. Supp. 132 (D. Haw. 1976). These cases could
also be considered an extension of Huffman to state administrative proceedings. See
note 186 and accompanying text infra.
160. Hearing Aid Ass'n of Kentucky, Inc. v. Bullock, 413 F. Supp. 1032 (E.D.
Ky. 1976) (three judge court).
161. Llewelyn v. Oakland County Prosecutor's Office, 402 F. Supp. 1379 (E.D.
Mich. 1975).
162. Kahn v. Shainswit, 414 F. Supp. 1064 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
163. Lerner v. Witting, 394 F. Supp. 866 (E.D. Wis. 1975).
164. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (three judge
court), vacated, 414 U.S. 473 (1974), on remand, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Wis. 1974),
vacated, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), on remand, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (E.D. Wis. 1976).
165. Hernandez v. Danaher, 405 F. Supp. 757 (N.D. 111. 1975) (three judge
court). See also Vail v. Quinlan, 406 F. Supp. 951 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (three judge
court).
166. DeGenna v. Grasso, 413 F. Supp. 427 (D. Conn. 1976). See also U.S. v.
Brown, 535 F.2d 424 (8th Cir. 1976); Williams v. Williams, 532 F.2d 120 (8th Cir.
1976); Ahrensfeld v. Stephens, 528 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1975); Bohner v. Circuit Ct.
of City of St. Louis, 526 F.2d 1331 (8th Cir. 1975).
167. 420 U.S. 592, 613 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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the long tradition of nonintervention in state criminal proceedings and
should not be extended to state civil proceedings traditionally subject to
federal intervention. 16 8 Justice Brennan's argument was based on long
recognized exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Statute which have permitted
federal intervention in state civil proceedings. 169 It seems, however, that his
primary purpose was to preserve the section 1983 suit, recently recognized
as an exception to the Anti-Injunction Statute, 17' as a vehicle for federal
intervention in state civil proceedings.
The Huffman majority showed no inclination to reject the long recognized occasions for federal relief against pending state civil proceedings,
but seemed more concerned with the possible use of the section 1983 suit to
intervene in state civil proceedings. Thus, while the opinions in Huffman
discussed the broad question of federal relief against pending civil proceedings, the underlying issue was whether section 1983 suits should be
available to seek declaratory and injunctive relief against pending state civil
proceedings. The majority's answer was in the negative, at least when
the
17 1
state is a party and the proceeding is closely related to criminal law.
Normally, the state will have to be a party to any civil proceeding
challenged in a section 1983 suit in order to satisfy the requirement of state
action. 172 Huffman then effectively precludes section 1983 suits against civil
proceedings closely related to criminal law. In addition, by reserving judgment on the application of Younger-Samuels standards to other types of civil
proceedings, the decision provides a foundation for further limitation of
section 1983 suits.
In Juidice v. Vail 173 the Court used the foundation in Huffman to

extend Younger-Samuels standards to a section 1983 suit seeking federal
intervention in pending state civil contempt proceedings. It held that
Younger principles were not limited to the Huffman type proceedings
closely related to criminal law and found that the state interest in contempt
168. Id. at 614-15.
169. See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 233-36 (1972); note 180 infra.
170. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972). See notes 110-13 and accompanying text supra.
171. 420 U.S. 592,604-05 (1975). A number of federal courts have emphasized
the status of the state as a party. See Hearing Aid Ass'n of Kentucky, Inc. v. Bullock,
413 F. Supp. 1032 (E.D. Ky. 1976) (three judge court); Burdick v. Miech, 409 F.
Supp. 982 (E.D. Wis. 1975) (three judge court); Hernandez v. Danaher, 405 F.
Supp. 757 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (three judge court); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp.
1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (tlaree judge court) vacated, 414 U.S. 473 (1974), on remand,
379 F. Supp 1376 (E.D. Wis. 1974), vacated, 421 U.S. 957, on remand, 413 F.
Supp. 1318 (E.D. Wis. 1976).
172. It is arguable that the state action requirement is met by the presence of a
state court judge in a civil proceeding between two private parties. If so, then a
§ 1983 suit may be brought against the judge to enjoin the civil proceeding. Considering the restrained view of the Court towards federal intervention, this commentator doubts it will find sufficient state action in this situation to warrant a
§ 1983 suit.
173. 45 U.S.L.W. 4269 (1977).
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proceedings was "of sufficiently great import as to require application of
the principles of [Younger and Huffman].' 7 4 The decision dealt specifically
only with contempt proceedings and "save[d] for another day the question
of 'the applicability of Younger to all civil litigation.' ,17 Clearly reflected
was the Court's desire to place further limits on federal intervention in
pending civil proceedings, especially through the use of section 1983.
Juidice established two requirements for application of YoungerSamuels standards. One is that the state have an important interest in the
pending state proceeding. The other is that the pending proceeding provide an opportunity for presentation of federal claims. These requirements
should not be major obstacles to application of Younger-Samuels standards
to section 1983 suits. Because the state generally will be a party to the civil
proceeding challenged in a section 1983 suit,1" 6 it is likely that the state will
be found to have an important interest in the proceeding. In addition the
pending state civil proceedings normally will provide an opportunity for
presentation of federal claims. The Juidice requirements may dictate the
application of Younger-Samuels standards to all section
1983 suits seeking
7
federal intervention in pending civil proceedings.
The applicability of Younger-Samuels standards to non-section 1983
suits seeking federal intervention'7 s in pending civil proceedings between
private parties has not yet been determined. Considering the view of the
Supreme Court towards federal intervention, it is almost certain that a
policy of judicial restraint will develop in this area. The Court could apply
Younger-Samuels standards generally to pending civil proceedings by finding the Juidice requirement of an important state interest in any civil
proceeding pending in state court. However, this step may be unnecessary.
In non-section 1983 suits seeking federal injunctive relief against pending
civil proceedings, the Anti-Injunction Statute 179 still provides an absolute
prohibition unless the suit falls within one of the legislative or judicial
exceptions to the statute."s The exceptions primarily pertain to the pro174. Id. at 4271.

175. Id. at 4272 n.13.
176. See note 172 supra.
177. If a § 1983 suit is available against a state court judge in pending civil
proceedings between private parties, see note 172 supra, then Juidice would not
extend Younger-Samuels standards to all § 1983 suits unless the state is found to
have an important interest in all civil proceedings, and the state civil proceeding is
found to provide an opportunity for presentation of federal claims. The effect of
such findings would be to extend Younger-Samuels standards to all civil proceedings
and raise questions about federal interference under traditional exceptions to the
Anti-Injunction Statute. See note 180 infra.
178. Aside from recognized occasions for federal injunctive relief, see note 180
infra, such suits would presumably be based on either equity and federal question
jurisdiction in federal courts or some arguable federal statutory authority.
179. See notes 101-15 and accompanying text supra.
180. In Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 233-36 (1972), the Court listed the
various exceptions:
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cedural relationship between federal and state courts and to areas in which
Congress has preempted state court jurisdiction. Unless the Court intends
to limit these exceptions, there is no reason to further extend the YoungerSamuels standards. Federal injunctive relief is already limited by the combination of the Juidice decision and the Anti-Injunction Statute.
A problem may arise from the possible use of a non-section 1983 suit
to seek declaratory relief against a pending civil proceeding between private parties. The Anti-Injunction Statute does not apply to declaratory
relief. In order to maintain its policy of judicial restraint, the Court would
have to extend Younger-Samuels standards generally to federal intervention
in pending civil proceedings or find another basis for denying declaratory
relief.
One alternative would be to resort to the standard of sound judicial
discretion for granting declaratory relief.' A declaratory judgment could
be found improper because it would not help settle the controversy. The
state court would not have to recognize the federal judgment and an
injunction to enforce the judgment would probably be barred by the AntiInjunction Statute.' If the Court does deny declaratory relief on such a
basis, then the decision in Juidice combined with the Anti-Injunction Statute results in an effective limitation on both injunctive and declaratory
federal intervention in pending state civil proceedings, despite the Court's
reservation of the question of extension of Younger-Samuels standards to all
pending civil proceedings. A section 1983 suit is prohibited unless it is
Express Legislative Exceptions
1. federal bankrupty proceedings.
2. legislation permitting removal of litigation from state to federal court.
28 U.S.C. § 1446(e).
3. legislation limiting the liability of shipowners. 46 U.S.C. § 185.
4. legislation providing for federal interpleader actions. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2361.
5. legislation conferring federal jurisdiction over farm mortgages. 11
U.S.C. § 203(s)(2).
6. legislation governing federal habeas corpus proceedings. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2251.

7. legislation providing for control of prices. Sec. 205 (a) of Emergency
Price Control Act of 1942, 56 Stat. 33.
Implied Judicial Exceptions
1. in rem exception-allowing federal courts to enjoin a state court
proceeding to protect jurisdiction over the res.
2. relitigation exception-enjoin relitigation in state court of issues already decided in federal court.
3. federal injunction of state court proceeding when the plaintiff in
federal court is the U.S. or a federal agency asserting superior federal
interests.
181. See notes 49-64 and accompanying text supra.
182. Such an injunction could arguably fit under the "needed to perfect or
effectuate judgments" exception to the Statute. See note 107 and accompanying
text supra. However, it is circular reasoning to claim that injunctive relief is proper
to effectuate a declaratory judgment under circumstances where the Anti-Injunction Statute bars direct injunctive relief.
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within an exception to Younger-Samuels and a non-section 1983 suit is
prohibited unless it is within an exception to the Anti-Injunction Statute.
The application of Younger-Samuels standards to pending civil proceedings is an extension of the principles of "Our Federalism." The propriety of the application of these standards should be judged primarily by the
strength of the doctrine of "Our Federalism" in regard to civil proceedings.
The strength of the doctrine may be measured by examining its component principles of equity, comity, and federalism to determine their relevance to state civil proceedings.
The basis for the equity component is that equity courts should not act
when the moving party has an adequate remedy at law and will not suffer
irreparable injury.' 83 Further, it has been traditionally held that equity
should not interfere with criminal proceedings.' 84 The general doctrine of
equitable restraint applies to intervention in civil proceedings, but without
the impact of the tradition in regard to criminal proceedings. When the
Court in Huffman restricted its holding to suits closely related to criminal
law, part of its motivation may have been to stay within that equitable
tradition.
The comity and federalism components of "Our Federalism" are closely related. 8 5 Both deal with the proper relationship between the state and
national governments. Comity may be narrowly considered as the mutual
respect required from the state and national judicial systems. When a
federal court enjoins a pending state proceeding, it matters little in comity
principles whether the proceeding is criminal or civil. The disruption and
discredit to the state judicial system is the same. Thus the comity component of "Our Federalism" applies equally to criminal and civil proceedings.
Federalism is a broad term describing the structure of our state and
national governments. "Our Federalism" concerns the mutual respect for
the functions and interests of each entity of government. The federal
government has an interest in protecting federal rights, but must do so
without unduly interfering with the legitimate functions of the state. In
criminal proceedings, the state function is the administration of a criminal
justice system, a responsibility primarily assigned to the states in our federal system. In civil proceedings, the state function is the administration of a
civil justice system, in which there is concurrent jurisdiction with federal
courts under federal diversity jurisdiction and on federal questions. It
follows that the federalism component of "Our Federalism" is more applicable to criminal than to civil proceedings.
The "Our Federalism" doctrine, particularly its equity and federalism
components, more strongly supports a policy of restraint in federal intervention in state criminal proceedings than in state civil proceedings. If the
components of "Our Federalism" are given equal weight, then the application of Younger-Samuels standards to all civil proceedings is difficult to
183. See note 71 and accompanying text supra.
184. See notes 22-25 and accompanying text supra.
185. See notes 72-73 supra.
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justify. Their application to criminal-type civil proceedings in Huffman
arguably is justified by the stronger relationship to the equity and federalism components of "Our Federalism." Their application in Juidice to civil
proceedings in which the state has an important interest also may be
justified by the stronger relationship to the federalism component. In
Juidice the Court stressed the comity and federalism components of "Our
Federalism."' 8 6 It expressly specified only the comity component, but described it in terms referring to both comity and federalism. The equity
component was not mentioned. This implies that the Court intends to give
greater weight to comity and federalism in determining the proper application of "Our Federalism." If the "more vital consideration"'8 7 behind the
doctrine is the comity component, the application of Younger-Samuels
standards to "important state interest" proceedings is therefore justified.
The application of those standards to all civil proceedings is arguably
justified.
The Supreme Court's treatment of section 1983 suits seeking federal
intervention in pending state proceedings should be noted. In Mitchum the
Court had the opportunity under the Anti-Injunction Statute to place an
absolute prohibition on section 1983 suits for injunctive relief, but refused
to do so. In the line of cases from Younger through Juidice, the Court has
effectively limited the present availability of relief through the section 1983
suit, but has retained the discretionary power to broaden future availability
in the recognition of exceptions when federal intervention could be appropriate.
B.

What Constitutes a Pending Civil Proceeding

The application of the Younger-Samuels standards to federal intervention in pending civil proceedings under Huffman and Juidice raises the
issue of what constitutes a pending civil proceeding. In Huffman the
federal plaintiff claimed that because the state court proceeding had ended
and because no appeal was taken there were no longer pending civil
proceedings. The Supreme Court rejected his contention and held that
"Younger standards must be met to justify federal intervention in a state
judicial proceeding as to which a losing litigant has not exhausted his state
appellate remedies."' 8 8 The dissent arguedB" that the holding undercut
the rule pronounced in Monroe v. Pape' that a federal plaintiff suing
under section 1983 need not exhaust state administrative or judicial remedies before filing his action. A more accurate reading of Monroe is that a
section 1983 suit is not barred by the fact that the plaintiff chose not to
initiate proceedings under an available state judicial or administrative
remedy. Monroe did not involve a situation where a state proceeding had
been initiated which provided, an adequate forum for the plaintiff's claims.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

45 U.S.L.W. 4571 (1977).
Id.
420 U.S. 592, 609 (1975).
Id. at 167 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
365 U.S. 167 (1961).
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It would be inconsistent with the respect for the state judiciary inherent in
the "Our Federalism" doctrine to permit a party to gain federal jurisdiction
by simply refusing to use available state appellate procedures.
There is no doubt that this aspect of the holding in Huffman also
applies to federal intervention in state criminal proceedings. A party convicted of state criminal charges cannot refuse to pursue his remedy of
appeal in state court and seek relief in federal court on the claim that no
state proceeding is pending.
An important question left open by Huffman and Juidice is the date on
which the existence of a pending state civil proceeding is to be determined.
The federal court must know whether to apply the date of filing of the
federal petition or the Hicks v. Miranda' rule of on the date prior to
proceedings of substance on the merits in federal court. If the standards of
Younger-Samuels on criminal proceedings can be extended to civil proceedings, the Hicks rule on criminal proceedings also should be extended. This
would give the individual with the right to bring the civil action, presumably the state prosecutor, the power to change the status of a threatened
party to a party facing pending state proceedings by initiating the action in
state court. The originally threatened party would then be subject to a
Huffman or Juidice dismissal. The principle in "Our Federalism" of respect
for the capacity of state courts to protect federal constitutional rights dictates that the federal plaintiff would not be prejudiced by having to pursue
his claim in state court. If state courts are judged fully competent to protect
federal rights in criminal proceedings under Younger-Samuels, there is no
reason to believe that the same courts cannot also protect federal rights in
civil proceedings. This commentator foresees application of the Hicks rule
to civil proceedings.
C. Threatened Civil Proceedings
A final area not considered in Huffman is the application of YoungerSamuels standards to federal declaratory and injunctive relief against
threatened civil proceedings. Reasoning by analogy from the Steffel and
Doran decisions holding that the standards do not apply to relief against
threatened criminal prosecutions, it is almost certain that they also do not
apply to relief against threatened civil proceedings. Therefore, declaratory
and injunctive relief against threatened civil proceedings apparently remain available under the traditional principles discussed earlier in regard
to relief against threatened criminal proceedings.'9 2 That availability is
subject to limitation, however, by extension of the Hicks rule giving to the
state prosecutor a de facto power to remove the action to state court by
initiating state proceedings and forcing the federal courts to apply YoungerSamuels standards.
191. 422 U.S. 332 (1975). See notes 136-41 supra.
192. See notes 140-47 and accompanying text supra.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol42/iss4/3

30

Finucane: Finucane: Our Federalism-The Limitation of Younger

OUR FEDERALISM

19771
VIII.

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS

Whether Younger-Samuels standards will be applied to suits seeking
federal injunctive or declaratory relief against state administrative proceedings has not been decided by the Supreme Court. 9 Gibson v. Berryhill'94 involved a section 1983 suit to enjoin the Alabama Board of Optometry from conducting scheduled hearings on charges against individual
optometrists. The Court ultimately remanded the case for consideration in
light of two Alabama Supreme Court decisions 195 narrowly interpreting the
underlying statutory authority and freeing the plaintiffs from charges of
misconduct. However, it discussed the application of Younger-Samuels
standards to civil proceedings and implied that the issue could be raised in
a suit to enjoin administrative proceedings. The Court stated that "administrative proceedings looking towards the revocation of a license to
practice medicine may in proper circumstances command the respect due
19
court proceedings.""
The implication was that if Younger-Samuels were
applied to civil proceedings, it would also be applied to at least certain types
of administrative proceedings.
In Huffman, the Court seemed to link the issues of federal intervention in pending civil proceedings and federal intervention in pending
administrative proceedings. It recalled that "a similar issue [whether Younger-Samuels bars intervention in state civil proceedings] was raised in Gibson
v. Berryhill."'197 This raises the possibility that Huffman provides a foundation for extending the Younger-Samuels standards to pending administrative proceedings.
193. The argument that the Court's summary affirmance of Geiger v. Jenkins,

316 F. Supp. 370 (N.D. Ga. 1970), aff'd mem., 401 U.S. 985 (1971), indicated
acceptance of the proposition that Younger-Samuels standards were applicable to
state administrative proceedings was rejected in Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564
(1973).
The Court has extended the Younger-Samuels principles of nonintervention to
injunctive relief against pending military court martial proceedings. Schlesinger v.
Councilman, 420 U.S. 738 (1975). The decision made no attempt to "define those
circumstances, if any, in which equitable intervention into pending court martial
proceedings might be justified." This indicates that-the availability of relief against
pending court martial proceedings is even more limited than the availability of
relief against pending criminal proceedings under the Younger-Samuels standards.
The Court cited Younger and related cases, but the decision was based more on
respect for an independent system of military justice than on the principles of "Our
Federalism." The decision does not provide a foundation for extension of YoungerSamuels standards to federal injunctive and declaratory relief against pending state
administrative proceedings.
194. 411 U.S. 564 (1973).
195. Lee Optical Co. v. State Bd. of Optometry, 288 Ala. 338, 261 So. 2d 17
(1972); House of $8.50 Eyeglasses, Inc. v. State Bd. of Optometry, 288 Ala. 349,
261 So. 2d 27 (1972).
196. 411 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1973).
197. 420 U.S. 592, 594 (1975).
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In Grandco Corp. v. Rochford"9 s the Seventh Circuit granted declaratory
relief against pending state administrative proceedings, but recognized
that Younger-Samuels standards apply to such intervention under some
circumstances. As conditions for applying the Younger-Samuels limitations
on federal intervention, the Court required a showing that the state interest in the administrative proceedings was substantial and that the proceedings provided a proper
forum for the vindication of the federal plaintiff's
99
constitutional claim.'
The only application of Younger-Samuels standards to administrativetype proceedings occurred in the series of cases involving bar disciplinary
proceedings discussed in the section on relief against pending civil proceedings. 0 In each case, the court found the disciplinary proceedings to
be judicial in nature rather than administrative. When combined with the
unique nature of bar disciplinary proceedings, this tends to limit any
broadening effect these cases might have on the application of YoungerSamuels standards to administrative proceedings. The cases are an example
of administrative-type proceedings which provide a forum that protects
federal constitutional rights.
Aside from the bar disciplinary proceeding cases, lower federal courts
have uniformly refused to extend Younger-Samuels standards to relief
against administrative proceedings. In Hodory v. Ohio Bureauof Employment
Services20 1 a three judge court rejected the argument that Huffman extended the Younger-Samuels standards to relief against pending administrative
proceedings. The court enjoined an employment bureau from enforcing a
benefit disqualification statute and stated that Huffman
[w]as limited to the enjoining of ongoing state initiated judicial
proceedings and that such prohibition did not extend to an action
brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983 in which a party
was challenging
2
state administrative action in federal court.

Other federal courts have refused to apply the Younger-Samuels limitation
in suits to enjoin a county board proceeding for removal of the county
treasurer, 20 3 to enjoin the operations of the New York State
Parole
20 5
Board, 20 4 and to enjoin a driver license suspension procedure.

There are at least two problems in extending the standards of YoungerSamuels and the doctrine of "Our Federalism" to pending administrative
proceedings. They may be analyzed by examining the doctrine's component principles. The first problem is the absence of a state court proceeding for the application of the doctrine's comity principle. A possible solu198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

536 F.2d 197 (7th Cir. 1976).
Id. at 206.
See note 159 supra.
408 F. Supp. 1016 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (three judge court).
Id. at 1020.
Clark v. Weeks, 414 F. Supp. 703 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (three judge court).
Cicero v. Olgiati, 410 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
Pollard v. Panora, 411 F. Supp. 580 (D. Mass. 1976) (three judge court).
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tion would be to require that the administrative proceeding "provide the
opportunity to raise and have timely decided by a competent state tribunal
the federal issues involved"2" 6 as a prerequisite to the imposition of Younger-Samuels standards. This would require the proceeding to be comparable to a state judicial proceeding and justify application of the doctrine's comity
principles. The second problem is the absence in the administrative proceeding of a relationship to the enforcement of state criminal law. This
lessens the application of the doctrine's equity and federalism principles. A
possible solution would be a Huffman-type rule requiring the administrative proceeding to be closely related to criminal law. This would make both
the equity and federalism principles applicable. The federalism principle
alone could be made applicable by requiring the state to have an interest in
the subject of the administrative proceeding so vital as to override the
national government's interest in protecting federal rights. "Our Federalism" is a doctrine that developed in response to the unique features of
federal intervention in state criminal proceedings. No matter which approach is used, it remains difficult to justify the extension of such a
doctrine to state administrative proceedings.
A further obstacle to extending Younger-Samuels standards to relief
against pending state administrative proceedings is the rule in McNeese v.
Board of Education20 7 that a federal plaintiff in a section 1983 suit need not
exhaust state administrative remedies prior to seeking equitable relief. It is
arguable that this precludes application of strict Younger-Samuels standards
to relief against pending administrative proceedings. However, the purpose of the McNeese rule is to give a party the option, prior to any state
proceedings on his claim, to seek relief either in federal court or in state
administrative proceedings. McNeese did not involve a situation where the
federal plaintiff was a party to a pending state administrative proceeding.
An extension of Younger-Samuels to state administrative proceedings could
be distinguished because it would necessarily involve a situation where the
federal plaintiff was already a party to a pending administrative pro2 08

ceeding.

206. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 577 (1973).
207. 373 U.S. 668 (1963). See also Damico v. California, 389 U.S. 416 (1967). In
Huffman, the Court noted two earlier cases stating that a challenge to administra-

tive action did not require exhaustion of state judicial remedies. The Court did not
mention exhaustion of state administrative remedies. 420 U.S. 592 n.21 (1975); City
Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Schnader, 201 U.S. 24 (1934); Bacon v. Rutland Ry. Co.,
232 U.S. 134 (1914).
208. If Younger-Samuels standards do not apply to threatened criminal or civil
proceedings, see parts VI, VII, then they certainly do not apply to threatened
administrative proceedings. If the Court extends Younger-Samuels standards to
administrative proceedings, the Hicks rule on the proper date for determining the
existence of a pending proceeding also could be extended. See notes 135-138, 191
and accompanying text supra. A question may arise whether there is a "pending
proceeding" after the final administrative determination but prior to state judicial
review. See notes 188-190 and accompanying text supra (analogy to civil proceeding). Even if there is no "pending proceeding" after the final administrative deterPublished by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1977
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This commentator foresees a limited application of Younger-Samuels
standards to declaratory and injunctive relief against pending state administrative proceedings. The limitation will possibly be restricted generally to proceedings which provide a proper forum for protection of federal
rights, and further restricted to certain types of proceedings, i.e., a proceeding closely related to criminal law as required in Huffman, or a proceeding in an area in which the state has an important interest as in
Juidice. If the Huffman decision eventually is expanded to cover all civil
proceedings, there may also be an expansion of coverage in administrative
proceedings.
IX.

CONCLUSION

The Younger-Samuels decisions and their progeny reflect five years in
the development of a policy of judicial restraint towards federal intervention in state court proceedings. The Supreme Court has used traditional
equitable principles to establish discretionary standards limiting the availability of declaratory and injunctive relief. While more objective standards
would seem attractive, the injunction and declaratory judgment are discretionary remedies and should be governed by discretionary standards.
These standards also enable the Court to retain the power to adjust the
availability of relief in accordance with its view of the need for federal
intervention. A look at history tells us that the Court's perception of the
necessity of federal intervention has varied with time. The discretionary
standards make it possible that federal intervention will someday reemerge
as an available remedy against state court proceedings in areas now restricted by Younger-Samuels.
More significant than the present standards for availability of federal
relief is the establishment of the policy of "Our Federalism." It is a policy of
respect for the function of the state courts in our federal system and has a
potential impact on the entire field of federal-state relations.20 9 While
discretionary standards governing relief may change, it is doubtful that the
Court would ever again grant federal intervention in state proceedings
without consideration of the principles of "Our Federalism." YoungerSamuels and their progeny are a reaffirmation of the basic federalism
principle to separate state and national governments following a period of
judicial activism with little emphasis on that principle.
BRIAN

J.

FINUCANE

mination, injunctive relief ordinarily would be denied without resort to YoungerSamuels standards because, under traditional equity principles, the state judicial
review would provide an adequate remedy at law.
209. For a good discussion of the potential broader impact of Younger-Samuels
see Ziegler, An Accomodation of the Younger Doctrine and the Duty of the FederalCourts
to Enforce Constitutional Safeguards in the State CriminalProcess, 125 U. PA. L. REV.
266 (1976).
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